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Instantaneous measurements of non-local observables between space-like separated regions can be
performed without violating causality. This feat relies on the use of entanglement. Here we propose
novel protocols for this task and the related problem of multipartite quantum computation with
local operations and a single round of classical communication. Compared to previously known
techniques, our protocols reduce the entanglement consumption by an exponential amount. We also
prove a linear lower bound on the amount of entanglement required for the implementation of a
certain non-local measurement.
These results relate to position-based cryptography: an amount of entanglement scaling expo-
nentially in the number of communicated qubits is sufficient to render any such scheme insecure.
Furthermore, we show that certain schemes are secure under the assumption that the adversary has
less entanglement than a given linear bound and is restricted to classical communication.
It is remarkable that the axioms of quantum mechanics are compatible with the severe restrictions imposed by
relativistic causality. From the early days of quantum mechanics, this miraculous fact has repeatedly been called into
question and has been a source of great controversy. Arguably the most well-known debate of this kind has centered
around the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox [1], which deals with the non-local correlations arising from a
bilocal measurement of an entangled state.
A similar discussion originated from concerns about the compatibility of the measurement process with relativistic
quantum field theory. In 1931, Landau and Peierls [2] showed that the electromagnetic field strength cannot be
accurately measured by means of point-like test charges: an uncertainty relation implies large fluctuations in their
positions, which in turn leads to the emission of radiation strongly influencing the field elsewhere. From this result,
Landau and Peierls concluded that, quite generally, the standard measurement prescription of quantum mechanics
does not apply in a relativistic setting.
Such difficulties reconciling quantum measurements with causality are strikingly apparent when considering non-
separable bilocal measurements (e.g., a von Neumann measurement in the Bell basis of two qubits). The instant
collapse of the wavefunction induced by such measurements allows to signal instantly between space-like separated
regions (see e.g., [3] for explicit examples). This may suggest that certain non-local observables are not measurable
at a well-defined time in a fixed Lorentz frame. As a consequence, one may be led to believe that their expectation
values do not carry any physical meaning. As with the EPR paradox, entanglement is at the root of this apparent
causal restriction on the set of physically allowed observables, yet in this case, it is the observable (or measurement)
instead of the state which is entangled. Somewhat ironically, entanglement also figures prominently in the resolution
of this issue.
Landau and Peierls’ far-reaching conclusions were soon challenged by Bohr and Rosenfeld [4], who showed how
the electromagnetic field strength can be measured using spatially extended charge distributions instead of point-like
test charges. Much later, Aharonov and Albert [5, 6] proposed a way of measuring certain non-local variables in a
manner consistent with causality. This involves the use of prior shared entanglement. A series of subsequent works [7–
11] characterizing and extending this kind of instantaneous measurements culminated in a scheme by Vaidman [12],
which allows to instantaneously measure any non-local observable. This disproves the stated existence of causality
restrictions on non-local measurements.
The basic achievement of such measurement schemes is illustrated in Fig. 1. Two space-like separated observers
Alice (A) and Bob (B) sharing a bipartite system AB aim to determine a certain non-local property of their joint state
ρAB = ρAB(t0) at a specific time t0. This property is described by a non-local POVM with operators O = {OγAB}γ ,
and their goal is to sample from the probability distribution
p(γ) = tr(OγABρAB) . (1)
The apparent causality problem arises when the operators constituting the measurement are non-separable. Vaidman
shows that this sampling problem can be solved as follows (see Fig. 1):
1. First, Alice and Bob apply local measurements at time t0 to their shared state ρAB ⊗ ηA′B′ . Here ηA′B′ is an
auxiliary shared entangled state. They obtain outcomes α and β, respectively.
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FIG. 1: Instantaneous measurement of a non-local observable OAB : Alice and Bob share, in addition to the state ρAB to be
measured, an auxiliary entangled state ηA′B′ (indicated by the wiggly line). They perform local measurements E = {E
α
AA′}α
and F = {F β
BB′
}β , respectively. Charlie computes a function γˆ = g(α,β) of their measurement results. The measurements
and the post-processing function are chosen in such a way that this simulates the measurement of ρAB with the non-local
POVM OAB = {O
γ
AB}γ .
2. Alice sends α and Bob sends β to Charlie (a point C in the intersection of the causal cones of A and B).
3. At a later time t > t0 after reception of the measurement outcomes (α, β), Charlie computes a value γˆ by
applying some function g to the pair (α, β).
In other words, all measurements are local and instantaneous and performed at time t0. The output is a value γˆ which
is computed at a time t > t0 at C, but is supposed to pertain to a non-local measurement of ρAB(t0) at time t0.
For any POVM {OγAB}γ , Vaidman constructs local measurements E = {EαAA′}α and F = {F βBB′}β and a postpro-
cessing function g such that the distribution
pˆ(γˆ) =
∑
(α,β):g(α,β)=γˆ
tr
(
(EαAA′ ⊗ F βBB′)(ρAB ⊗ ηA′B′)
)
is close to the distribution (1). Entanglement therefore allows to estimate expectation values of non-local observables
at a specific instant in time without violating causality.
Beyond realizing the statistics of non-local measurements, Vaidman’s scheme also provides an instantaneous im-
plementation of non-local operations. Here the goal is to apply a (non-local) unitary UAB to the joint state ρAB of
Alice and Bob. They are restricted to applying local operations and only a single round of simultaneously passed
classical communication, see Fig. 2. This very limited form of interaction acts as a non-signaling constraint and makes
this task non-trivial for general unitaries. Again, Vaidman’s techniques demonstrate that prior shared entanglement
allows to implement such non-local operations. This fact was first recognized in [13], where it was used to address a
problem in cryptography.
Explicitly, a general protocol in this model proceeds as follows (see Fig. 2):
1. Alice and Bob simultaneously apply (partial) local measurements {EαA1}α and {F βB1}β to the joint state ρAB ⊗
ηA′B′ , where ηA′B′ is the shared entanglement. Here we have partitioned Alice’s complete system AA
′ into
subsystems A1 and A2, and similarly for Bob.
2. Alice and Bob then simultaneously communicate α and β to each other.
3. Subsequently, Alice applies a local postprocessing CPTP map Mα,β : B(A2) → B(A) chosen according to the
measurement outcomes (α, β). Bob similarly applies a postprocessing CPTP map N α,β : B(A2)→ B(B).
Vaidman’s scheme gives, for every unitary UAB, measurements and postprocessing operations such that the final state
after these operations is close to UABρABU
†
AB.
Our focus here is on the amount of shared entanglement required for the implementation of such primitives.
Assuming that A and B consist of n qubits each, we give procedures which solve these tasks to arbitrary constant
precision while consuming O(n28n) ebits of entanglement. In contrast, earlier schemes based on Vaidman’s ideas
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FIG. 2: Instantaneous implementation of a non-local unitary UAB on a bipartite state ρAB using the shared entangled
state ηA′B′ . Alice and Bob perform local (partial) measurements E = {E
α
A1
}α and F = {F
β
B1
}β where A1A2 = AA
′ and
B1B2 = BB
′, respectively. This results in the residual state ρα,βA2B2 := trA1B1
((
IA2⊗B2 ⊗ E
α
A1
⊗ F βB1
)
(ρAB ⊗ ηA′B′)
)
/p(α, β)
with probability p(α, β) = tr
((
IA2⊗B2 ⊗ E
α
A1
⊗ F βB1
)
(ρAB ⊗ ηA′B′)
)
. According to the (communicated) measurement re-
sults (α, β), Alice and Bob apply local post-processing operations Mα,β and N α,β, respectively. The measurements and
postprocessing operations are chosen such that the resulting average state ρˆAB =
∑
α,β p(α, β)
(
Mα,β ⊗N α,β
)
(ρα,βA2B2) is close
to the target state UABρABU
†
AB .
require an amount of entanglement scaling doubly exponentially with n. Our protocols are considerably simpler
because they are based on a modified version of teleportation proposed by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [14, 15].
It is worth emphasizing that our procedures only use the POVM {OγAB} or the unitary UAB as a black box (and
do not depend on their particular form), and moreover are universal in the sense that the number of required ebits is
independent of the particular measurement or unitary that is implemented. For specific instances, much more efficient
schemes are known: in [3], it was shown that it is possible to realize a non-local unitary U by consuming an amount of
entanglement exponential inM , whereM is the length of a factorization of U = R1 · · ·RM into Pauli rotations {Rj}j.
Note, however, that for a generic n-qubit unitary, M is exponentially large in n, and then our scheme again provides
an exponential saving for a typical unitary.
On the negative side, by constructing a specific example, we show that a linear number of ebits is generally
insufficient to perform an instantaneous distributed measurement. This impossibility result improves upon [13],
where it is shown that a certain such task cannot be performed without shared entanglement.
Our results significantly tighten previously known upper and lower bounds on the amount of entanglement required
for instantaneous non-local measurement and computation, but still leave an exponential gap. We conjecture that
the entanglement scaling of our protocols is essentially optimal among protocols which only make black-box use of
the unitary or measurement, as explained above.
These results have direct application to position-based quantum cryptography, which attempts to exploit the lo-
cation of an entity as its only credential. Our techniques show that any such scheme is insecure in the presence of
malicious players sharing an amount of entanglement exponential in the number of communicated qubits. This was
previously known only when the amount of entanglement is doubly exponential [13].
On the other hand, we prove the security of certain protocols assuming that the adversarial players have less
entanglement than a given linear bound and are restricted to classical communication. We show that under these
assumptions, certain protocols have exponential soundness, i.e., the adversarial players have a negligible probability
of cheating successfully. In contrast, previously known security proofs achieving exponential soundness [13] do not
allow any prior entanglement (while also requiring the restriction to classical communication, see discussion after
equation (15) below).
We present two types of protocols with exponential soundness assuming limited entanglement and classical commu-
nication: the first one relies on the impossibility of implementing a certain high-dimensional instantaneous measure-
ment, whereas the second one is obtained by parallel composition and reduction to the case of adversaries without
prior entanglement. The latter scenario was previously analyzed in [13]. It gives rise to a protocol which can be
realized using single-qubit manipulations only.
The restriction to (unlimited, but) classical instead of quantum information is natural in the study of resource re-
quirements for instantaneous measurement and computation. Indeed, allowing (unlimited) quantum communication
4would render instantaneous measurements trivial. Also, given an implementation of an instantaneous quantum com-
putation, quantum communication can easily be traded against a corresponding increase in prior entanglement (using
teleportation). However, in position-based quantum cryptography, the restriction to classical communication is less
natural: ideally, security should be established even in the case where the adversaries are allowed to communicate an
arbitrary amount of quantum information. Such strong results are currently only known with constant soundness and
a zero or constant amount of prior entanglement. Establishing similar results for e.g., a linear amount of entanglement
and exponential soundness is a major open problem in this context. The following table summarizes this state of
affairs:
soundness allowed communication pre-shared ebits reference
constant quantum zero/constant [13, 16]
exponential classical zero [13]
exponential classical linear Lemma V.2/Lemma V.4
exponential quantum e.g., linear open problem
I. REVIEW OF VAIDMAN’S SCHEME: TELEPORTATION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION
We briefly discuss the implementation of a bipartite unitary UAB using Vaidman’s scheme [12]. While this is not
directly needed for the discussion of our scheme, it helps to clarify the nature of our simplifications. In particular, in
Section IC, we will discuss how the doubly exponential scaling of the entanglement consumption arises in Vaidman’s
procedure.
Vaidman’s scheme assumes that Alice and Bob share a large supply of EPR pairs |Φ〉A′B′ = 1√2 (|0〉A′ |0〉B′ +
|1〉A′ |1〉B′). This entanglement can in principle be used for teleportation [17]: to teleport a qubit state |Ψ〉A to Bob,
Alice measures A and her part A′ of an EPR pair in the Bell basis. She obtains each outcome k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} with equal
probability 1/4. We will refer to such a measurement as a teleportation measurement. Conditioned on her outcome
being k, Bob’s register B′ contains the state σk|Ψ〉A, where {σi}3i=0 are the Pauli operators. Standard teleportation
then proceeds by Alice sending k to Bob, and Bob applying the correction operation σk.
Clearly, n shared EPR pairs can be used to teleport an arbitrary n-qubit state |Ψ〉: Alice’s teleportation mea-
surement is a tensor product measurement between each qubit and one half of an EPR pair. It gives each outcome
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n with probability 4−n. Bob’s state in his part of the EPR pairs then ends up being σk|Ψ〉A, where
σk = σk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σkn . Sending k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n to Bob allows him to apply the Pauli correction σk.
In a setting with free classical communication, applying a unitary to their joint state would easily be achievable
using teleportation: Bob teleports n qubits (system B) to Alice using n ebits of entanglement. Alice applies UAB
and teleports the system B back to Bob. However, teleportation cannot directly be used for instantaneous non-local
computation because outcomes of teleportation measurements cannot be communicated. To get around this problem,
Vaidman uses an elaborate recursive technique which we explain in Section IB.
A. Reduction to a state held by one of the parties
It is instructive to see that, while teleportation is not directly applicable in the setting of instantaneous measurement,
it can nevertheless be used advantageously. In the following we show that in order to implement a bipartite unitary U =
UAB applied to a state |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉AB ∈ (C2)⊗n⊗(C2)⊗n it suffices to provide a protocol P ′ with the following properties:
it proceeds by application of local operations only (no communication is allowed) and after completion of the protocol,
Bob holds the state σsU |Ψ〉 in one of his registers, and Alice and Bob have classical information α and β (measurement
outcomes) that together determine s = s(α, β) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}2n. If we design such a P ′, the procedure of implementing
the unitary U on |Ψ〉 is immediate:
1.a Alice and Bob run P ′, getting classical outcomes (α, β) and the state σsU |Ψ〉 in Bob’s registers B′1B′2, where
s = (α, β).
1.b Bob performs a teleportation measurement on B′1 and n EPR pairs shared between Alice and Bob in registers
A′′ : B′′. He obtains the outcome v ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n.
2 Alice sends α to Bob. Bob sends β and v to Alice.
3 Alice and Bob both compute s = s(α, β). Let s = (sA, sB) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n× {0, 1, 2, 3}n. Alice applies σsAσv to A′′,
while Bob applies σsB to B
′
2.
5At the end of this protocol Alice and Bob share U |Ψ〉 in A′′ : B′2.
B. Vaidman’s recursive scheme
We now show how Vaidman realizes a protocol P ′ as described in the previous section. Even though the final
measurements are done instantaneously and simultaneously, it is useful for the construction to think of an interactive
procedure. Since no communication is allowed in P ′ and Alice and Bob’s measurements commute, this interactive
protocol is indeed instantaneous.
In the first round, Bob performs a teleportation measurement on B and his part of n ebits in registers A′1 : B
′
1.
Conditioned on the outcomes being t1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n, Alice now has the state (IA ⊗ σt1 )|Ψ〉 in AA′1. Since Alice is
ignorant of t1, she cannot apply the corresponding correction operation. Instead, she simply applies U
(1) = U to her
state, and then performs a teleportation measurement between the resulting state and 2n ebits in registers A′′1 : B
′′
1
shared between Alice and Bob. Denoting by s1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}2n be the outcome of Alice’s measurement, Bob holds the
state σs1U(IA ⊗ σt1)|Ψ〉 in his register B′′1 , which can be written as
U (2)
s1
(t1)
†U |Ψ〉 where U (2)
s1
(t1) = U(IA ⊗ σt1)U †σs1 . (2)
Clearly, if t1 = 0
n, then U
(2)
s1 (t1) = σs1 . This means that Bob has a state of the desired form and can stop. In the
actual protocol, this means that Bob does not perform further measurements. However, t1 = 0
n happens only with
probability 4−n.
Vaidman’s crucial insight was that it is possible to recursively apply this procedure, essentially attempting to imple-
ment U
(2)
s1 (t1) in the next round. However, this is not entirely straightforward since Bob’s measurement outcome t1
(unlike s1) is unknown to Alice. To get around this, Alice and Bob use, for every possible outcome tˆ1 of Bob’s
measurement result, a separate set of 2n ebits in registers A′
1,ˆt1
: B′
1,ˆt1
for the Bob’s teleportation measurements, and
2n ebits in registers A′′
1,ˆt1
: B′′
1,ˆt1
for Alice’s measurements. In essence, this allows Alice to implement operations which
effectively depend on the outcomes t1 of the previous round. She just applies, for each tˆ1, a suitably chosen operation
to registers A′
1,ˆt1
and A′′
1,ˆt1
which may depend on tˆ1. Because Bob holds t1, he knows which pair (B
′
1,ˆt1
, B′′
1,ˆt1
) of
registers is the relevant one containing the desired state.
Explicitly, in the second round, Bob performs a teleportation measurement on B′′1 and his part of the 2n ebits A
′
1,t1 :
B′1,t1 . Let t2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}2n be the corresponding outcomes. He does not use the other registers. Then Alice, for each
tˆ1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n, applies U (2)s1 (ˆt1) to register A′1,ˆt1 and performs a teleportation measurement between A
′
1,ˆt1
and A′′
1,ˆt1
getting outcome s2(ˆt1). At the end of these operations, Bob, in register B
′′
1,t1 , holds
U (3)
s1,s2(t1, t2)
†U |Ψ〉 where U (3)
s1,s2(t1, t2) = U
(2)
s1
(t1)σt2U
(2)
s1
(t1)
†σs2 (3)
where s2 = s2(t1), and he neglects other registers B
′′
1,ˆt1
, tˆ1 6= t1. Similarly as before, if t2 = 02n, which happens with
probability 4−2n, Bob has σs2U |Ψ〉 and has reached the goal. Note that the total number of ebits used in the second
round is 4n · 4n.
It is clear how to continue this recursion: in the R-th round, Alice and Bob use, for every possible sequence
(ˆt1, . . . , tˆR−1) of Bob’s outcomes in the previous rounds, 2n ebits A′1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1 : B
′
1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
and 2n ebits A′′
1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
:
B′′
1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
. Bob performs a teleportation measurement between B′′1,t1,...,tR−2 and his part of the 2n ebits A
′
1,t1,...,tR−1 :
B′1,t1,...,tR−1 . For each sequence (ˆt1, . . . , tˆR−1), Alice applies the unitary U
(R)
sˆ1 ,ˆs2,...,ˆsR−1
(ˆt1, . . . , tˆR−1) to A′1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
where sˆj = sˆj (ˆt1, . . . , tˆj−1). She also performs a teleportation measurement between A′1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1 and her part of the
2n ebits A′′
1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
: B′′
1,ˆt1,...,ˆtR−1
. Bob, in register B′′1,t1,...,tR−1 ends up with
U (R+1)s1,...,sR(t1, . . . , tR)
†U |Ψ〉 where
U (R+1)s1,...,sR(t1, . . . , tR) = U
(R)
s1,...,sR−1(t1, . . . , tR−1)σtRU
(R)
s1,...,sR−1(t1, . . . , tR−1)
†σsR . (4)
Each round leads to a trivial correction operation tR = 0
2n with probability 4−2n. As soon as Bob obtains this
outcome in some round R, he stops performing any further measurements. Alice, on the other hand, continues
applying her operations until she has operated on all the entangled states available to the two parties.
The classical information α sent by Alice consists of the sequence of all her measurement results {sj(t)}j,t. Bob’s
message β consist of the number of rounds R and all his measurement results (t1, . . . , tR). Bob holds σsRU |Ψ〉 in
B′′1,t1,...,tR−1 , where sR is determined by (α, β), as required.
6C. Entanglement consumption in Vaidman’s scheme
The amount of entanglement required in R rounds is roughly proportional to the number of sequences (ˆt1, . . . , tˆR−1)
and therefore exponential in R. Since the probability of success in each round (except the first round which is 4−n)
equals 4−2n, to reach the success probability 1 − ε, R needs to be roughly log(1/ε) · 24n. As a result, the amount of
required entanglement for a constant ε is doubly exponential in n.
Clearly, the reason for this unfavorable behavior is the recursive structure of the protocol, which is a consequence
of the non-interactive way the teleportation correction operations are dealt with. Our simplified schemes avoid these
problems altogether by making use of a different kind of teleportation scheme whose correction operations are in some
sense trivial. In particular, the resulting scheme is non-recursive.
II. PORT-BASED TELEPORTATION
In this section, we review a form of teleportation introduced by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [14, 15]. To distinguish this
kind of teleportation from the better known usual scheme, we borrow from their terminology and call this port-based
teleportation.
A. Teleportation without correction
The goal of port-based teleportation is to achieve teleportation with simpler correction operations on Bob’s side.
Instead of being able to apply arbitrary Pauli operations, we assume that Bob can only perform the arguably simplest
imaginable CPTP map depending on classical information. That is, Bob can discard any subsystem of his choosing
according to the classical information received from Alice.
Remarkably, teleportation is still possible in this restricted setting using a more intricate measurement on Alice’s
side. Concretely, Alice wants to teleport a qudit state |Ψ〉A from her system A ∼= Cd to Bob’s system B ∼= Cd.
We assume that Alice and Bob share N copies of the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉 in registers
A′1 : B
′
1, A
′
2 : B
′
2, . . . , A
′
N : B
′
N . We fix an orthonormal standard basis in each of these spaces. The protocol proposed
in [14] then proceeds as follows:
1. Alice performs a certain POVM {EiAA′N}Ni=1 on her systems, where A′N = A′1 · · ·A′N . She sends the result i to
Bob.
2. Bob discards everything except the subsystem B′i and calls it B. This register is supposed to hold the state |Ψ〉.
Let E|Φ〉⊗N : B(A) → B(B) be the CPTP map described by this protocol taking the original state |Ψ〉A to Bob’s
system B′i ∼= B by using auxiliary entanglement |Φ〉⊗N . (Here B(A) denotes the set of bounded linear operators on a
Hilbert space A.) Explicitly, this map is given by
E|Φ〉⊗N (ρA) =
N∑
i=1
trB′N\B′i trAA′N
(
(IB′N ⊗ EiAA′N )(ρA ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|⊗NA′NB′N )
)
. (5)
In this expression, trB′N\B′i : B(B′N)→ B(B) denotes the CPTP map consisting of tracing out all systems except B′i ∼=
B. The main result of [14, 15] is that there exists a choice of a POVM {EiAA′N }i such that this CPTP map is close
to the identity channel for large N .
The measure of distance used in [14, 15] to compare a channel E : B(A) → B(B) to the identity channel IA :
B(A)→ B(A) ∼= B(B) is the entanglement fidelity
F (E) = tr |Φ〉〈Φ|BC(E ⊗ IC)(|Φ〉〈Φ|AC) , (6)
where |Φ〉 is the maximally entangled state. Because of the relation [18]
(F (E)d + 1)/(d+ 1) =
∫
〈Ψ|E(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)|Ψ〉 dΨ ,
between entanglement fidelity F (E) and the output fidelity averaged over the Haar measure on all pure input states, a
lower bound on (6) expresses how well E preserves quantum information for random inputs on average. The following
is shown in [14, 15].
7Theorem II.1 ([14, 15]). Let |Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉 be the maximally entangled state. There is a POVM {EiAA′N }Ni=1
on Cd ⊗ (Cd)⊗N such that the CPTP map E|Φ〉⊗N defined by (5) satisfies
F (E|Φ〉⊗N ) ≥ 1−
d2 − 1
N
.
Due to the importance of port-based teleportation to our schemes for instantaneous computation, we give a detailed
derivation of Theorem II.1 in A.
Instead of measuring average-case closeness to the identity channel, it is desirable to have worst-case bounds. In
other words, we would like to show that the state on B at the end of the port-based teleportation scheme is close to
the original input state on A for all inputs. This requires using a distance measure different from the entanglement
fidelity (6). A natural distance measure on the set of CPTP maps is the completely bounded trace norm or diamond
norm denoted ‖ · ‖⋄. This norm is defined in terms of the trace norm
‖L‖1 = tr
√
L†L , L ∈ B(A) .
The trace norm induces a norm
‖Ω‖1 = max
L∈B(A):‖L‖1≤1
‖Ω(L)‖1
on the set of superoperators Ω : B(A)→ B(B). The diamond norm is defined as
‖Ω‖⋄ = sup
k≥1
‖Ω⊗ ICk‖1 (7)
where ICk is the identity (super)operator on B(Ck).
Given two CPTP maps E : B(A) → B(B) and F : B(A) → B(B), ‖E − F‖⋄ is a natural measure of their distance
because of the following operational interpretation. The quantity
1
2
+
1
4
‖E − F‖⋄
is equal to the probability of successfully distinguishing E from F when a single instance of either one of these channels
is provided with equal prior probability. This implies that the diamond-distance can only decrease under composition
of maps.
Corollary II.2. Let |Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉 be the maximally entangled state. There is a POVM {EiAA′N}Ni=1 on
Cd ⊗ (Cd)⊗N such that the CPTP map E|Φ〉⊗N defined by (5) satisfies
‖E|Φ〉⊗N − ICd‖⋄ ≤
4d2√
N
.
Proof. Consider a superoperator Ω : B(A) → B(B) and let C ∼= A. The Choi-Jamiolkowski representation [19, 20]
of Ω is the operator
J(Ω) := (Ω⊗ IC)(|Φ〉〈Φ|AC) .
J(Ω) is a quantum state if Ω is a CPTP map. Since J(ICd) = |Φ〉〈Φ|, the entanglement fidelity F (E) is equal to the
overlap of the states J(ICd) and J(E), i.e.,
F (E) = tr(J(ICd)J(E)) .
Because J(ICd) is pure, we can use the general inequality (see e.g., [21])
1
2
∥∥ρ− |Ψ〉〈Ψ|∥∥
1
≤
√
1− 〈Ψ|ρ|Ψ〉
bounding the distance between a pure state |Ψ〉 and a mixed state ρ. We conclude that
1
2
‖J(E|Φ〉⊗N )− J(ICd)‖1 ≤
√
1− F (E) . (8)
The claim then follows from the linearity of the map J , inequality (8) and the following lemma applied to Ω =
E|Φ〉⊗N − ICd .
8Lemma II.3. For every two CPTP maps Ω1,Ω2 : B(A)→ B(B) we have
‖Ω1 − Ω2‖⋄ ≤ 2(dimA)‖J(Ω1)− J(Ω2)‖1 .
Proof. Let Ω = Ω1 − Ω2 and C ∼= A. It is well-known (see e.g., [22]) that for any such Ω
‖Ω‖⋄ = ‖Ω⊗ IC‖1 = max|Ψ〉AC ‖(Ω⊗ IC)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)‖1
= 2max|Ψ〉AC ,0≤PBC≤IBC tr (PBC(Ω⊗ IC)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)) .
On the other hand, for every |Ψ〉AC there exists MC such that |Ψ〉AC = IA ⊗MC |Φ〉AC , where due to normalization
trM †CMC = dimA. Then we have
Ω⊗ IC(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = IB ⊗MC J(Ω)BC IB ⊗M †C .
As a result,
‖Ω‖⋄ = 2maxMC ,0≤PBC≤IBC tr
(
(IB ⊗M †C PBC IB ⊗MC)J(Ω)BC
)
≤ 2maxMC ,0≤PBC≤IBC ‖IB ⊗M †C PBC IB ⊗MC‖∞ · ‖J(Ω)BC‖1
≤ 2(dimA)‖J(Ω)BC‖1 ,
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the operator norm, and in the last line we use the normalization of MC .
III. PROTOCOLS FOR INSTANTANEOUS MEASUREMENT AND COMPUTATION
Here we propose and analyze two novel protocols for instantaneous measurement and computation. Both protocols
depend on a parameter N which captures the amount of entanglement consumed and the accuracy achieved by
the protocol. The first protocol πN (O) gives an instantaneous realization of a (non-local) POVM O = {OγAB}γ .
The second protocol πN (U) implements a non-local unitary UAB. In the following descriptions, we divide up the
instantaneous (simultaneous) application of measurements by both Alice and Bob into several stages to simplify the
analysis. Note, however, that the actions of Alice and Bob commute and do not have to be performed in the prescribed
order.
Protocol πN (O): implementation of POVM O = {OγAB}γ on a state |Ψ〉AB ∈ (C2)⊗n ⊗ (C2)⊗n.
Alice and Bob share n ebits of auxiliary entanglement in A′ : B′, and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, 2n ebits
of entanglement in A′′j : B
′′
j . We write A
′′N = A′′1 · · ·A′′N and B′′N = B′′1 · · ·B′′N .
1(a). Bob performs a teleportation measurement between B and B′ with outcomes t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n. As a result,
Alice holds the bipartite state (IA ⊗ σt)|Ψ〉AA′ .
1(b). Alice applies the port-based teleportation-measurement on her 2n qubits in systems AA′ and her part of the
shared entanglement in A′′N : B′′N . She gets an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and Bob obtains (IA ⊗ σt)|Ψ〉 (with
high fidelity) in the i-th system B′′i .
1(c). For each j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Bob first applies I⊗ σt to B′′j and then measures it using the POVM O. Let γj be
the outcome of this measurement.
2. Alice sends i, and Bob sends the list {(j, γj)}j to Charlie.
3. Upon receiving this classical information, Charlie outputs γi.
9Protocol πN (U): implementation of a unitary UAB on a state |Ψ〉AB ∈ (C2)⊗n ⊗ (C2)⊗n
Alice and Bob share auxiliary systems A′A′′N : B′B′′N as in protocol πN (O). Here we assume that each
A′′j is partitioned into an A-part and a B-part (with n qubits each), and similarly for B
′′
j . They additionally
share, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, n ebits of entanglement in systems A′′′j : B′′′j .
1(a)-1(b). Execute steps 1(a) and 1(b) of protocol πN (O).
1(c). For every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Bob applies U(I⊗σt) to B′′j . Then he performs a (usual) teleportation measurement
between the A-part of B′′j and B
′′′
j . Letting vj ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n be the outcome of this measurement, systems
A′′′i and the B-part of B
′′
i now contain (σvi ⊗ I)U |Ψ〉 (with high fidelity).
2. Alice sends i to Bob, and Bob sends the list {(j,vj)}j to Alice.
3. Alice discards everything except A′′′i , on which she applies σvi . Bob discards everything except the B-part
of B′′i .
To quantitatively express the accuracy of these protocols, we use the diamond norm. For this to make sense
for POVMs, we regard a POVM E = {Ei}i as a CPTP map with output diagonal in the standard basis, i.e.,
E(ρ) = ∑i tr(Eiρ)|i〉〈i|. The following theorem is an easy consequence of Corollary II.2 and the fact that the
diamond-distance does not increase under the composition of CPTP maps.
Theorem III.1. The protocols introduced in this section have the following properties for any ε > 0.
(i) Let O = {OγAB}γ be a bipartite POVM on (C2)⊗n⊗ (C2)⊗n. Set N := 28n+4/ε2 and let M be the POVM defined
by protocol πN (O). Then M approximates O up to accuracy
‖M−O‖⋄ ≤ ε
and consumes
n
(
1 +
28n+5
ε2
)
ebits of entanglement.
(ii) Let U = UAB be a bipartite POVM on (C
2)⊗n⊗ (C2)⊗n. Set N := 28n+4/ε2 and let E be the CPTP map defined
by protocol πN (U). Then E approximates U up to accuracy
‖E − U‖⋄ ≤ ε
while consuming
n
(
1 +
3 · 28n+4
ε2
)
.
ebits of entanglement.
These protocols and their analysis can clearly be extended in a straightforward manner to multipartite (i.e., more
than bipartite) non-local POVMs and unitaries.
IV. A LOWER BOUND
In this section, we show that there is a measurement on 2n qubits which is not realizable instantaneously with
fewer than n/2 ebits of entanglement. Our construction is based on mutually unbiased bases. A pair of orthonormal
bases {|e1x〉}dx=1 and {|e2y〉}dy=1 of Cd is called mutually unbiased if
|〈e1x|e2y〉|2 =
1
d
for all x, y ∈ {1, . . . , d} .
It is known [23–25] that if d = pn is a power of a prime number, then a set of d + 1 pairwise mutually unbiased
bases {Ba := {|eax〉}dx=1}da=0 exists in Cd. We will assume that d is of this form (specifically d = 2n).
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Theorem IV.1. Suppose that two parties Alice and Bob share one of the states
ρxAB =
1
d+ 1
d∑
a=0
|a〉〈a|A ⊗ |eax〉〈eax|B x ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
each with prior probability 1/d, and additionally have an (arbitrary) shared entangled state ηA′B′ . They are asked to
output x with an instantaneous measurement (cf. Fig. 1). Then their success probability is upper bounded by
psucc ≤ 2 dimB
′
√
d
. (9)
Proof. Because of the linearity of the success probability as a function of the input ensemble, it suffices to prove the
bound (9) in the case where Alice and Bob receive |a〉 and |eax〉 respectively, each with probability 1/d(d+ 1).
Since Alice’s input A is a classical register (containing a), we may assume without loss of generality that her
message α to Charlie is determined by measuring the register A′ using a POVM {Ea,αA′ }α which depends on a. Letting
{F βBB′}β be Bob’s measurement and g be the classical post-processing function, the success probability is equal to
psucc =
1
d(d+1)
∑
a,x
∑
α,β:g(α,β)=x tr
(
(Ea,αA′ ⊗ F βBB′)(|eax〉〈eax|B ⊗ ηA′B′)
)
= 1d(d+1)
∑
a,x
∑
α,β:g(α,β)=x tr
(
F βBB′(|eax〉〈eax|B ⊗ τa,αB′ )
)
,
where
τa,αB′ = trA′ ((E
a,α
A′ ⊗ I′B)ηA′B′) .
Using
τa,αB′ ≤ tr(τa,αB′ )IB′ , (10)
we have
psucc ≤ 1d(d+1)
∑
β tr
(
F βBB′
(∑
a,α tr(τ
a,α
B′ )|eag(α,β)〉〈eag(α,β)|B ⊗ IB′
))
≤ 1d(d+1)
∑
β tr(F
β
BB′)
∥∥∥∑a,α tr(τa,αB′ )|eag(α,β)〉〈eag(α,β)|B ⊗ IB′∥∥∥∞
= 1d(d+1)
∑
β tr(F
β
BB′)
∥∥∥∑a,α tr(τa,αB′ )|eag(α,β)〉〈eag(α,β)|B∥∥∥∞ .
If we show that ∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a,α
tr(τa,αB′ )|eag(α,β)〉〈eag(α,β)|B
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ d+ 2√
d
+ 1 for every β , (11)
the claim of the theorem follows because
psucc ≤ d+
√
d+2
d(d+1)
√
d
∑
β tr(F
β
BB′) =
d+
√
d+2
d(d+1)
√
d
tr IBB′
= d+
√
d+2
(d+1)
√
d
dimB′ ≤ 2 dimB′√
d
.
It remains to prove (11) for a fixed β. Consider the (not necessarily normalized) vector
|V 〉BR =
∑
a,α
√
tr(τa,αB′ )|eag(α,β)〉B ⊗ |a, α〉R ,
where R is an auxiliary Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|a, α〉R}a,α. Denoting by M the matrix of interest
in (11), we have
‖M‖∞ = ‖trR |V 〉〈V |BR‖∞ = ‖trB |V 〉〈V |BR‖∞
=
∥∥∥∥∑a,a′,α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a′,α′
B′ ) 〈ea
′
g(α′,β)|eag(α,β)〉|a, α〉〈a′, α′|
∥∥∥∥
∞
.
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On the other hand, by a simple triangle inequality we obtain that for every matrix (cij)i,j , ‖(cij)i,j‖∞ ≤ ‖(|cij |)i,j‖∞,
where | · | denotes the absolute value of a complex number. Therefore,
‖M‖∞ ≤ µ+ ν
where
µ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1√
d
∑
a,a′,α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a′,α′
B′ )|a, α〉〈a′, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
,
and
ν =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a
∑
α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a,α′
B′ )(δg(α,β),g(α′,β) −
1√
d
)|a, α〉〈a, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
.
The first summand can be bounded as
µ ≤ 1√
d
∑
a,α
tr(τa,αB′ ) =
1√
d
∑
a
tr(trA′ ηA′B′) =
d+ 1√
d
.
To bound the second term, we use the direct sum property ‖C ⊕D‖∞ = max{‖C‖∞, ‖D‖∞}, the triangle inequality
and the easily verified fact that
‖K‖∞ ≤ ‖K + L‖∞
for real symmetric matrices K and L with nonnegative entries. This gives
ν = max
a
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a,α′
B′ )(δg(α,β),g(α′,β) −
1√
d
)|a, α〉〈a, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ max
a
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a,α′
B′ )δg(α,β),g(α′,β)|a, α〉〈a, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
+
1√
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a,α′
B′ )|a, α〉〈a, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ (1 + 1√
d
)max
a
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
α,α′
√
tr(τa,αB′ ) tr(τ
a,α′
B′ )|a, α〉〈a, α′|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
= (1 +
1√
d
)max
a
∑
α
tr(τa,αB′ ) = 1 +
1√
d
. (12)
Combining (IV) and (12) yields (11).
This result may be expressed in terms of the diamond norm. Let {Ua}da=0 be the set of unitaries that rotate the
standard basis into a set of such mutually unbiased basis, i.e., Ua|x〉 = |eax〉 and let
UAB =
d∑
a=0
|a〉〈a| ⊗ U †a .
Then
OAB = {Ox = (IA ⊗ |x〉〈x|B)UAB}dx=1 . (13)
is a POVM that exactly outputs x under a randomly chosen ρxAB.
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Corollary IV.2 (Impossibility of instantaneous measurement). LetMAB = {Mx}x be an instantaneous measurement
on Cd ⊗ Cd implemented with shared entanglement ηA′B′ as in Fig. 1. If dimB′ ≤ ε
√
d, then
‖MAB −OAB‖⋄ ≥ 2(1− 2ε) ,
where OAB is the POVM (13).
Proof. Define
ρXAB =
1
d
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxAB .
Then due to the definition of the diamond norm we have
‖MAB −OAB‖⋄ ≥ ‖IX ⊗MAB(ρXAB)− IX ⊗OAB(ρXAB)‖1
= 2(1− psucc)
≥ 2(1− 2ε) ,
where psucc denotes the probability that MAB successfully finds x, and in the last line we use Theorem IV.1.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POSITION-BASED QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Position-based cryptography revolves around the idea of using the geographical location of an entity as its only
credential. One of the most basic position-based primitives is position-verification: Here a prover P tries to convince
a set of verifiers {Vi}Si=1 that he is at a specific location ~r0 ∈ RD in space (D = 3 is of most interest in practice,
of course). Proposed protocols for this problem usually assume that the verifiers are located throughout space at
different positions ~rVi (such that ~r0 is e.g., in the convex hull of {~rVi}i) and have synchronized clocks. They proceed
by applying distance bounding techniques [26]: the verifiers send challenges to P and obtain bounds on their distance
to P by measuring the time taken for his responses to arrive. All computational processes are assumed to be essentially
instantaneous, that is, fast in comparison to the ratio between the desired spatial resolution and the speed of light.
A number of classical protocols for position-verification have been proposed in the past (see e.g., [13] for a list
of references), but it was shown in [27] that security is unachievable by any classical protocol without additional
assumptions if there are colluding adversaries (at different locations). Position-based quantum cryptography attempts
to overcome this impossibility using quantum cryptographic techniques. Its history is somewhat reminiscent of the
study of bit commitment: this primitive was also known to be classically unachievable and the use of quantum
cryptographic techniques appeared promising for a while. Then, Mayers [28], and Lo and Chau [29] showed that
secure bit commitment is generally unachievable in a quantum setting. We refer to [30] for a nice introduction to
the basic ideas of position-based quantum cryptography with examples of simple attacks on specific schemes. Further
attacks on previously proposed schemes were found by Lau and Lo in [16], and a general impossibility proof was given
by Buhrman et al. [13] based on Vaidman’s techniques for instantaneous measurements.
The impossibility of secure position-based quantum cryptography has motivated the search for schemes secure under
additional assumptions. Since known attacks rely on entanglement shared between colluding adversaries, it is natural
to limit the amount of entanglement available to adversaries. In [13], a position-based scheme was shown to be secure
under the assumption that the adversaries share no entanglement. In [16], a security proof for a scheme was given
that relies on the assumption that the adversaries share entanglement in the form of a two- or three-level system.
Our results on instantaneous quantum computation tighten the impossibility result of [13] by reducing the amount
of entanglement required for a successful attack to an exponential (instead of doubly exponential) amount. On the
positive side, we provide a single-round protocol which is secure if the adversaries share less entanglement than a given
linear bound and are restricted to classical communication. We also relate the security of a protocol in the setting of
no prior shared entanglement to its security in the case where the adversaries have a limited amount of entanglement
(and are otherwise unrestricted). This implies for example that the multi-round protocol of [13] remains secure even
if the adversaries share less than a linear amount of entanglement.
To illustrate the main points, we focus on the problem of position-verification in D = 1 dimension. We assume that
the (honest) prover is at a location r0 between the two verifiers V1 and V2, i.e., rV1 < r0 < rV2 and wants to convince
them of this fact. We consider protocols which satisfy the following correctness condition: if P is located at r0, he
can always make the verifiers accept. A colluding set of adversaries {P˜i}Mi=1 may try to convince the verifiers that
at least one of them is at location r0, while in fact, none of them actually is, |rP˜i − r0| > ∆ (where ∆ is the desired
spatial resolution). The figure of merit is the soundness of such a protocol. Following [13], we say that a protocol
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for position-verification is ε-sound if any colluding set of adversaries {P˜i}Mi=1 cannot make the verifiers accept with
probability more than ε.
For concreteness, we discuss the following protocol πn for position-verification. It depends on a parameter n and
involves, as in Section IV, a set of unitaries {Ua}da=1 taking the computational basis of Cd to d mutually unbiased
bases, where d = 2n.
Protocol πn(r0): position-verification proving that P is at r0 ∈ R
V0 and V1 are at positions rV0 < r0 < rV1 and share common (secret) randomness in the form of uniformly
distributed bit strings a, x ∈ {0, 1}n.
1. V0 sends a to P and V1 prepares the state Ua|x〉 and sends it to P . The timing is chosen such that both the
classical information and the quantum state arrive at r0 at the same time.
2. P measures the state in the basis {|eai 〉}i, getting measurement outcome xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n. He sends xˆ to both V0
and V1.
3. V0 and V1 accept if they receive xˆ at times consistent with xˆ being emitted from r0 in both directions
simultaneously (instantaneously after a and Ua|x〉 reach r0), and xˆ = x.
It is easy to check that this protocol is correct in the sense defined above. This and similar protocols have
been studied in a series of papers [13, 16, 30–32]. The motivation for considering such protocols originated from
the no-cloning principle. It seems to suggest that to successfully convince the verifiers, some cheating adversaries
have to clone the (classical) information x without knowledge of the basis this information is encoded in. It was
realized early on, however, that this intuition is misleading because entanglement between colluding adversaries can
render such schemes insecure. That is, consider two colluding adversaries P˜1, P˜2 located on either side of r0, with
rV1 < rP˜1 < r0 < rP˜2 < rV2 . We assume that their distance |rP˜i − r0| > ∆ from r0 is larger than the desired spatial
resolution ∆. We further assume that they share entanglement. Specializing the results of [13] to the protocol πn(r0)
and using our version of instantaneous computation then gives
Lemma V.1. Protocol πn(r0) is not ε-sound against P˜0 and P˜1 if they share n
(
1 + 2
8n+5
(1−ε)2
)
ebits of entanglement.
Proof. To attack the protocol, P˜0 and P˜1 are faced with the analogous challenge as Alice and Bob in the situation
described in the proof of Theorem IV.1 (with d = 2n instead of d + 1 mutually unbiased bases). The soundness
parameter ε is equal to the success probability of correctly guessing x based on an instantaneous measurement of
their state ρxAB. Since the non-local POVM O defined by (13) does so with certainty, it suffices to approximate this
POVM by an instantaneous measurement with accuracy 1 − ε in diamond norm. The claim therefore follows from
Theorem III.1 (i).
In contrast, the results of [13] rely on Vaidman’s techniques, and therefore only show insecurity if P˜0 and P˜1 share
a doubly exponential (in n) amount of entanglement. The same proof technique applies to more general protocols,
including multiple parties, see [13].
On the positive side, we prove security of the protocol πn(r0) against adversaries limited as follows: they share
fewer than n/2 ebits of entanglement and are restricted to classical communication.
Lemma V.2. For n > 1, the protocol πn(r0) is 2 · 2m−n/2-sound against adversaries P˜0 and P˜1 sharing at most m
ebits of entanglement and communicating only classical information.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma V.1, we can upper bound the soundness of the protocol πn(r0) by Alice and Bob’s
success probability in the setting of Theorem IV.1. Adapting the proof of the latter shows that the upper bound (9)
holds even if d = 2n instead of d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases are used. The claim follows immediately.
The protocol πn(r0) may not be very practical if n is large because it requires even honest parties to manipulate
n qubits at a time. It has, however, the appealing feature that it consists of only one round of communication
between the verifiers and the prover and nevertheless achieves exponential security. In the setting where quantum
communication is allowed, we may ask whether and how this degree of security could be achieved with a similar
one-round protocol. Answering this may prove challenging because of the locking effect [33].
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To obtain a more practical protocol with exponential security, we can consider multi-round protocols: sequential
composition decreases the soundness error of a protocol. For example, it is shown in [13] that the protocol π := π1(r0)
is ε-sound (even when allowing quantum communication) with
ε = ε(π1(r0), ∅) < 1− h−1(1/2) < 1 , (14)
if there is no shared entanglement between P˜0 and P˜1. Here we write ∅ to signify absence of entanglement and h(p) =
−p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) is the binary entropy function. (We point out that similar results were found in [16] for a
constant amount of prior entanglement, that is, qubits or qutrits.) Equation (14) implies (see [13, Corollary 2]) that
the L-fold sequential composition π◦L has exponentially small soundness error
ε(π◦L, ∅) ≤ ε(π, ∅)L < (1− h−1(1/2))L (15)
if the adversaries share no entanglement and are restricted to classical communication between rounds. The restriction
to classical communication is necessary as the adversaries could otherwise distribute and use an arbitrary amount of
entanglement in the course of attacking the composed protocol.
We now show that sequential composition of a protocol can provide exponential security even in a setting where the
adversaries have a linear amount of entanglement. This is based on the following relation between the no-entanglement
setting and the case of a limited amount of entanglement.
Lemma V.3. Consider a protocol π achieving position-verification with soundness error ε(π, ∅) in the case where the
adversaries share no entanglement. In a setting where the adversaries share an (arbitrary) entangled state ηA′B′ , its
soundness error ε(π, ηA′B′) is upper bounded as follows:
ε(π, ηA′B′) ≤ dimA′ dimB′ · ε(π, ∅) .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the protocol π takes the following form. In a first step, a
quantum state ρABST is distributed, with the adversaries P˜0, P˜1 holding A and B, respectively, and the verifiers V0
and V1 holding S and T . This step is followed by various (arbitrary) actions of the adversaries alternating with actions
of the verifiers as prescribed by the protocol. We can describe this by a CPTP map F acting on the initial state and
the entanglement shared by the adversaries. Finally, a binary valued measurement {E, I − E} (where 0 ≤ E ≤ I) is
applied to the resulting state. Its outcome determines whether or not the verifiers accept. The soundness error of a
protocol π when P˜0 and P˜1 have a shared entangled state ηA′B′ can then be expressed as
ε(π, ηA′B′) = maxF
tr(EF(ρABST ⊗ ηA′B′)) . (16)
Here the maximum is over all CPTP maps compatible with the protocol, i.e., resulting from combining an arbitrary
cheating strategy of the adversaries with the fixed actions of the verifiers.
We use the same kind of proof strategy as before (cf. (10)), replacing shared entanglement by the completely mixed
state. Let F∗ be the optimal POVM achieving the maximum on the rhs. of (16). Then
ε(π, ηA′B′) = tr(EF∗(ρABST ⊗ ηA′B′))
≤ tr(EF∗(ρABST ⊗ IA′B′))
= dimA′ dimB′ tr(EF∗(ρABST ⊗ θA′B′))
where θA′B′ is the completely mixed state on A
′B′. But this expression is equivalent to simply having shared
randomness between the adversaries. This implies that
tr(EF∗(ρABST ⊗ θA′B′)) ≤ ε(π, ∅)
and the claim follows.
Combining (15) with Lemma V.3, we obtain the following statement.
Lemma V.4. Consider two adversaries sharing an arbitrary entangled state ηA′B′ on (C
2)⊗k⊗ (C2)⊗k and restricted
to classical communication. The L-fold sequential composition π1(r0)
◦L of the protocol π1(r0) is ε-sound if
L ≥ 2k + log 1/ε
log 1/δ
where δ = 1− h−1(1/2) .
Lemma V.4 and Lemma V.2 give roughly the same scaling for the maximal amount of tolerable prior entanglement
as a function of the soundness parameter. However, the protocol of Lemma V.4 is arguably more practical.
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Appendix A: Derivation of port-based teleportation
In this appendix, we give a proof of Theorem II.1 by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [14]. We mostly follow [14] and
first show the equivalence of port-based teleportation to the problem of distinguishing a certain set of states in
Appendix A1. In Appendix A2, we present a general lower bound on the success probability of the so-called pretty
good measurement [34]. Combining these two facts in Appendix A3 we obtain Theorem II.1.
1. From port-based teleportation to distinguishing quantum states
The crucial observation made by Ishizaka and Hiroshima is the fact that the fidelity of port-based teleporta-
tion achieved by a certain POVM {EiAA′N}Ni=1 is directly related to a quantum hypothesis testing problem: It is
a simple function of the average success probability when using the POVM to distinguish a certain ensemble of
states {ηiAA′N }Ni=1 with equal prior probabilities. The following lemma expresses this fact.
Lemma A.1 (Equivalence of port-based teleportation with hypothesis testing [14]). Let |Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉 be the
maximally entangled state. Let AA′NBB′N ∼= Cd ⊗ (Cd)N ⊗ Cd ⊗ (Cd)N and define the states
ηi = trB′N\B′i |Φ〉〈Φ|⊗NA′NB′N (A1)
on A′N ⊗Bi ∼= A′N ⊗B ∼= A′N ⊗ A for i = 1, . . . , N using the canonical isomorphism between A and B. Consider a
POVM {Ei := EiAA′N }Ni=1 on AA′N ∼= Cd ⊗ (Cd)N and let
psucc =
1
N
N∑
i=1
tr(Eiηi)
be the average probability of successfully distinguishing the states {ηi}Ni=1 with uniform prior distribution using this
POVM. Let E = E|Φ〉⊗N : B(A) → B(B) be the port-based teleportation map (5) associated with the POVM. The
entanglement fidelity of this CPTP map satisfies
F (E) = N
d2
psucc .
Proof. Fix an orthonormal basis for systems A ∼= B ∼= C ∼= A′i ∼= B′i ∼= Cd. We write EA = FB for two operators EA
and FB acting on isomorphic Hilbert spaces A and B if their matrix elements in the computational basis coincide.
The entanglement fidelity of E is equal to
F (E) = trPBC(E ⊗ IC)(PAC) ,
where P = |Φ〉〈Φ| is the projection onto the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉|i〉. Omitting identity
operators and tensor products for ease of notation, we have
F (E) =∑Ni=1 trPBC trB′N\B′i trAA′N EiAA′NPAC |Φ〉〈Φ|⊗NA′NB′N
=
∑N
i=1 trPBC trAA′N E
i
AA′NPACη
i
A′NB
=
∑N
i=1 trPBCE
i
AA′NPACη
i
A′NB .
For every operator X we have
(X ⊗ I)P = (I⊗XT )P and P (I⊗X) = P (XT ⊗ I) , (A2)
where XT is the transpose of matrix X (with respect to the standard basis). Then
PBCE
i
AA′NPAC = PBC(E
i
CA′N )
TCPAC
= PBC
(
(EiBA′N )
TB
)TB
PAC
= PBCE
i
BA′NPAC (A3)
Reinserting (A3) and using the fact that the partial trace of P is the fully mixed state we obtain
F (E) = 1
d2
N∑
i=1
tr
(
EiA′NBη
i
A′NB
)
=
N
d2
psucc .
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2. A lower bound on the success probability of the pretty good measurement
Having reduced port-based teleportation to a hypothesis testing problem, it remains to show that there is a suit-
able POVM solving the latter. Concretely, we need to provide a POVM {Ei}Ni=1 that distinguishes the family of
states {ηi}Ni=1, defined by (A1). Ishizaka and Hiroshima [14, 15] show that the pretty good measurement
Ei =

∑
j
ηj


−1/2
ηi
(∑
k
ηk
)−1/2
for i = 1, . . . , N (A4)
does so with sufficiently high success probability
ppgmsucc =
1
N
N∑
i=1
tr(Eiηi) . (A5)
Here we rederive and generalize their bound on the quantity (A5): we derive a general lower bound on the success
probability of the pretty good measurement for any (uniform) family of states { 1N , ηi}Ni=1 (see Lemma A.3 below).
We will apply this bound to port-based teleportation in Appendix A 3.
Our main technical tool is the following inequality.
Lemma A.2. Let X and Y be non-negative operators on two (not necessarily identical) Hilbert spaces, satisfying
trX = tr
√
Y .
Then
trX2 ≥ (tr Y )
3
rankX trY 2
. (A6)
Proof. For every non-negative operators X,Y and α, γ > 0, we have
α · trX2 ≥ α1/2√
rankX
2 trX − 1 , (A7)
γ · 2 tr
√
Y ≥ 3− 1γ2(tr Y )3 · tr Y 2 . (A8)
These inequalities follow easily from
X2 ≥ 2X − IsuppX ,
2
√
Y ≥ 3Y − Y 2 ,
and rescaling. (Such inequalities have previously been used e.g., in [35, Eq. (32)] for channel coding). Using trX =
tr
√
Y we obtain
trX2 ≥ 2
α
− rankX
α2(tr Y )3
trY 2 ,
and the claim follows by letting α =
(
(trY )3
rankX tr Y 2
)−1
.
The proof of the lower bound on the success probability of the pretty good measurement is now straightforward:
Lemma A.3. Consider an ensemble of states { 1N , ηi}Ni=1. The success probability (A5) of the pretty good measurement
is bounded by
ppgmsucc ≥
1
Nr¯ tr η¯2
where
η¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ηi and r¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
rankηi .
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Proof. Define the (unnormalized) operators
ρIQ =
∑N
i=1 |i〉〈i|I ⊗ ηi
Y = trI ρIQ ,
X = (II ⊗ Y )−1/4ρIQ(II ⊗ Y )−1/4 .
It is easy to check that
ppgmsucc =
1
N trX
2
trX = tr(trI X) = tr
√
Y .
The claim then follows from Lemma A.2 using rank(Y −1/4ηiY −1/4) = rankηi.
3. Proof of Theorem II.1
To prove Theorem II.1, we combine the reformulation of Lemma A.1 with the lower bound on the success probability
of the pretty good measurement (Lemma A.3).
According to Lemma A.1, we need to consider the problem of distinguishing the states
ηi = |Φ〉〈Φ|A′iB ⊗
(
ρ⊗(N−1)
)
A′N\A′i
, (A9)
where ρ = I/d is the completely mixed state. We have
tr
(|Φ〉〈Φ|A′
1
B ⊗ ρA′
2
) (
ρA′
1
⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|A′
2
B
)
= 1/d3 ,
and then
tr(ηi)2 = 1/dN−1
tr ηiηj = 1/d3 · 1/dN−2 , for i 6= j .
As a result,
tr η¯2 =
1
NdN−1
+
N − 1
NdN+1
for the ensemble average η¯ = 1N
∑
i η
i. Furthermore, we have r¯ = rankη1 = dN−1. Using Lemma A.3, we conclude
that
ppgmsucc ≥ 1NdN−1( 1
NdN−1
+ N−1
NdN+1
)
= d
2
N
(
1
1+ d
2−1
N
)
≥ d2N
(
1− d2−1N
)
.
In particular, according to Lemma A.1, this implies that there is a POVM {EiAA′N}Ni=1 such that the associated CPTP
map E|Φ〉⊗N achieves port-based teleportation with entanglement fidelity
F (E|Φ〉⊗N ) =
N
d2
ppgmsucc ≥ 1−
d2 − 1
N
,
as claimed.
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